Abstract-Identifying the detrimental effect of environmental factors and subsystem interactions are historically one of the most challenging aspects of early hazard assessment in the design of complex avionic systems. Therefore, a complete understanding of potential failure effects before and even after a catastrophe happens is a very difficult task. This paper proposes a model-based hazard analysis procedure for early identification of potential safety issues caused by unexpected environmental factors and subsystem interactions within a complex avionic system. The proposed methodology maps hazard and vulnerability modes to specific components in the system and analyzes the hazard propagation paths for risk control and protection strategies. The main advantage of the proposed method is the ability to provide the designers with means to use low-fidelity, high level models to identify hazardous interactions. Using this technique, designers can examine the collective impacts of environmental and subsystem risks on overall system during early stages of design and develop a hazard mitigation strategy.
INTRODUCTION
F O R some years the rapid development of technology has led to the creation of systems and projects of increasing size and complexity, particularly in aircraft and automotive industry. The creation of ever-complex systems is made possible by integrating increasingly complex subsystems, i.e."systems of systems". Therefore, the system integration process has become more demanding due to the potential undesired interactions between subsystems and risks of components failure due to environmental factors. These types of influences are difficult to pinpoint during the design process, yet are often cause of major malfunctions or failures throughout the system.
One example of such an accident is the failure in landing of the Mars Polar Lander [1] , which was attributed to the spurious signals generated by magnetic sensors in the landing legs to indicate the occurrence of the touchdown. While the Mars 2001 lander was connected to the parachute, tests illustrated that the spurious signals were generated in two consecutive steps because of the deployment of the landing legs. The Lander's controller software incorrectly accepted these signal noises as an indication of touchdown, even though, it persisted for two consecutive readings of the sensors and shuts the engines down precipitately. The result of this unwanted interaction caused the spacecraft to crash, even though the software and the landing legs were functioning as expected. The crash occurred as a result of designers not accounting for all the interactions between the control software and the leg deployment component. Therefore, as Keating et al. [2] describes, conventional system engineering methodologies are not capable of addressing the ambiguity and uncertainty that naturally exists in complex systems. In addition, in [2] the authors propose that a more effective design procedure for complex systems should incorporate both the unpredictable interaction between subs-systems and the effect of environmental factors. In the same way, the Department of Defense Acquisition Guidebook [3] recognizes that the designers of individual components and subssystems must be able to identify the impact of other systems on their design architecture. Such information can be applied to ensure the designed sub-system can deliver its functionality while at the same time mitigating or eliminating a variety of integration issues. This paper seeks to develop a model-based hazard analysis methodology for early identification of undesirable interactions between subsystems and components failure due to environmental factors within a highly integrated avionic system. In order to help with this goal, the fundamentals of hazard-vulnerability pairs and propagation path identification presented by Malin and Fleming in [4] is used. The proposed scheme in this paper is applied to a satellite electrical power system (EPS) using the System Modeling Language (SysML) and XMISearch tool for scripting hazardous scenarios. The choice of SysML is motivated by its support for analysis, design, and verification of complex systems [5] . This paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the background and related research on safety analysis of undesirable interactions and vulnerabilities in complex systems. Section III provides an overview of the proposed model-based hazard process. Section IV specifies the hazard types to be considered for construction of hazard ontology. Section V, outlines the application of the proposed methodology in analyzing the safety issues for a satellite electrical power system design. Section VI illustrates the application of the proposed methodology for hazard analysis and elimination of unsafe designs. Conclusion and future work are presented in Section VII.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
It is widely recognized that designing highly complex systems without any associated risks is a challenging task. As observed in [6] , the subs-systems in complex systems are required to interact directly or indirectly with many other systems which results in a very large number of interactions. For example, a typical weapon system is connected to other systems, vehicles, soldiers, and satellites with numerous interactions [6] . In [7] , Leveson argues that traditional hazard analysis techniques are based on assumptions that are only valid for specific domains such as simple mechanical and automotive systems. The hazard analysis in such designs is based on the main assumption that an accident in the system is the result of component failures. However, in the complex systems more often that not an accident is a result of erroneous interaction between acceptable and nominal behavior of its components. As a result, [7] suggests that safety analysis for complex systems needs to be based on a new model which he calls systems-theoretic accident modeling and processes (STAMP). In systematic models such as STAMP, accidents result from several causal factors that occur unexpectedly in a specific time and space [8] . Therefore, the system under consideration is not viewed as a static entity but as a dynamic process that is constantly adapting to achieve its goals and reacting to internal and environmental changes. Consequently, hazards are viewed as complex interactions between system components and their intended environment. The STAMP models are designed based on safety-related constraints and hazards are identified by violation of these safety constraints.
There are many benefits in using the STAMP models as the basis for hazard analysis of a complex system. However, Johnson et al. [9] state that the STAMP approach has two fundamental weaknesses: 1. It lacks a methodological guideline in implementing the constraint flaw taxonomy, the knowledge require to implement these types of models. 2. Its approach of constructing control models of a complex system are complicated. In addition, [9] presents two independent studies for implementing STAMP hazard analysis techniques on the result of accident occurred on the joint project between European Space Agency (ESA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) solar and heliocentric observatory (SOHO). The hazard analysis from each study resulted in significantly different conclusions regarding the cause of failure in the system under study.
Another technique for safety analysis is hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) [10] which is based on modeling the interaction flow between components and recognizing a hazard if components deviate from the operation that was intended for the component during the design. Using HAZOP a set of guide words are used to assist with the identification of such deviations. However, from the context of safety analysis based on interaction between components and their intended environments, HAZOP is unable to produce repeatable hazard analysis of the same accident due to the highly dynamic and unpredictable nature of the interactions between different subsystems and their operational environment. Moreover, depending on the expertise and skills of the safety engineers the deviations can be identified and interpreted erroneously .
As discussed in this section existing works on hazard analysis lack accuracy in identification of potential safety issues caused by unexpected environmental factors and subsystem interactions. In addition, the algorithms in the literature do not attempt to identify the hazards within the system in the early stages of the conceptual design process.
The proposed model-based hazard methodology in this paper improves the safety analysis process by emphasizing the importance of precision in hazard definitions and integration at the early stages of system design by using hazard ontology and requirement definition diagrams. This methodology also provides SysML notations for describing and reasoning about certain aspects of hazards.
OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
In order to identify the potential hazards and avoid potential costly solutions to these hazards, an effective safety analysis methodology must be conducted as early as possible in the project cycle, ideally at conceptual design level. Therefore, in this paper a methodology based on the evaluation of the design architecture, identifying the hazards, and modifying the design to mitigate these safety issues is proposed. The process is an iterative approach, where each cycle is repeated until no hazard is detected by the algorithm. An overview of the process is shown in Fig. 1 . 
HAZARD TYPES AND IDENTIFICATION
In recent years, the development of design repositories and ontology-based frameworks has gained extensive attention [11] . These frameworks are applied to manage the complexity of the design information in highly integrated system. A knowledge based ontology is used to specify a structured information model for organizing design knowledge, map requirements, and aid integration of subsystems. However, these ontologies do not provide any hazard information, even though the designers need hazard type information for each component and connection in order to analyze their threats and effects on the overall system. Therefore, a hazard ontology needs to be constructed for each system design based on the hazard and vulnerability associated with each component in the system. In this context, hazard is the poten-tial source that causes harm and constitutes deviation from intended design or operation. These hazards can be caused by the interactions between the components or environmental impact on the system. An example of such a common source of unsuspected hazard is sources and propagation paths of stored energy in electrical, chemical, or mechanical form. For the purpose of this work, the hierarchical hazard types in [12] are used as a reference to create a general hazard ontology for these types of hazard sources. Note that each category of energy source outlined in Table 1 , is required to be methodically traced from the perspective of the conceptual design components and across subsystem interfaces to locate possible hazardous deviations. Creating an ontology for each design problem requires identification of the source of hazard in almost any circumstance which is only possible if detail knowledge of the system and its operation is known. Effectiveness of the ontology is highly dependent on broad hazard coverage of software, hardware, environmental, and human systems.
MODEL-BASED AUTOMATED SAFETY ANALYSIS
The proposed design and safety analysis process for early identification of the unexpected hazard sources and propagation paths is based on the conceptual design information. Conceptual design is a preliminary stage of the design process that describes the requirements comprehensively and abstractly, while identifying the optimized principle and solution to be used for the design. To initiate the conceptual design process, it is strongly recommended [13] , [14] to proceed with the development of product architecture which is base on the functional model of the product. However, most existing functional models are difficult to translate into functional architectures for early hazard analysis during the design process of a complex system. This transformation is challenging since the construction of a complex system with integrated hazard information requires designers to map the design requirements, the components' hazard-vulnerability properties, and hazard ontology models using a unified modeling environment. Therefore, a modeling language that provides a simple but powerful approach for modeling a wide range of engineering processes is required. The System Modeling Language (SysML) [5] is a graphical modeling language for systems engineering applications. SysML is particularly an effective tool to be used during specification and design of system engineering for specifying safety requirements, structure, and functional behavior of the system under consideration [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] . For the purpose of hazard analysis SysML is applied in this paper to capture and integrate design and safety information during the conceptual design process with focus on system functions and structures. Therefore, as illustrated in Fig.  2 from the taxonomy of SysMl diagrams, two main categories of requirement and structural diagrams are used to provide ontalogies and component connection models for identifying and investigating system functions, treats, and safeguards. A requirement diagram enables designers to construct a system and safety requirement model from a textbased specification document and identify the relationship between these constraints. In addition, this diagram is used to trace specifications to model elements, track model elements that satisfy a particular specification, and verify whether the requirement is fulfilled by each model element. Block definition diagram is a sub-category of structure diagram and is used to connect components and define their properties, operations, relationships, hazards, vulnerabilities, and transmitted entities. The block definition diagram is derived from the requirement diagram which in turn is derived from the system specification document. In the block definition diagram, the default hazard, vulnerability, and transmitted risks are associated with each component by the use of hazard ontology, which provides a structure for matching hazard and vulnerability types with each component in the system.
Satellite Electrical Power System
The proposed model-based hazard methodology is applied to the electrical power system (EPS) known as the Advanced Diagnostics and Prognostics Testbed (ADAPT). ADAPT is an electrical power system (EPS) developed at NASA Ames for supporting the development of diagnostic and prognostic models; for evaluating advanced warning systems; and for testing diagnostic tools and algorithms [19] . ADAPT is representative of electrical power systems deployed in aerospace vehicles. The EPS is designed to deliver power to select loads, which in an aerospace vehicle includes the avionics, propulsion, life support, and thermal management systems. The EPS is required to provide basic functionality common to many aerospace applications: power storage, power distribution, and operation of loads [20] . Fig. 3 displays the existing design of the EPS, containing a power source connected through a series of relays to an inverter and several loads consisting of a large fan, a direct-current (DC) resistor and a alternating-current (AC) resistor. A series of four AC or DC voltage sensors and three current transmitters measure the voltage and current at different points throughout the circuit. The first step in identifying the hazardous scenarios is to construct a hazard ontology for the EPS design problem. Table 2 illustrates the developed hazard ontology and libraries of types of components, hazards, vulnerabilities, and transmitted entities for hazard analysis of the EPS system under consideration. Next, a SysML requirement diagram for the specified satellite EPS system is created using the EPS design requirements. The constraint under consideration here requires that a battery relay to be installed in each battery circuite to enable the flight crew to isolate the battery from the rest of the electrical subsystems. Fig. 4 depicts the corresponding SysML require- In addition, each operational mode has a function and side effect action associated with it. For example, in the EPS testbed, the power source component may have the operational modes on and off. The on-mode has the functional action of generating power and a side effect action of generating over current spikes. As illustrated in Fig. 5 , three hazard properties are defined for the power source block. On the other hand, the AC resistor, fan, and DC resistor are vulnerable to the generated over current spikes. These types of information are provided by the hazard ontology database constructed in stage one. As depicted in Fig. 5 , block definition diagram models the causal relationship between the hazard source in this case the power source and the impacted targets which are the AC resistor, DC resistor, and fan.
Hazard Path Analysis
Although, the analysis of the constructed block definition diagram identifies the source of hazards and susceptible components in the system design, it does not verify safety violations. Since the threats introduced to the system by a hazard source may propagate from the hazard source to the vulnerable components via other components and connections, they might be mitigated or eliminated.
Given that in the block definition diagram all the components and connections are associated with the hazard carrier type, in this paper the path analyzer procedure is proposed to compare the hazard type with the specification of each component. If the component cannot mitigate the effect of the hazard, it is propagated to the next component or connection while if the component can eliminate the threat caused by the hazard, the proposed path analyzer deems the specific hazard as resolved. The proposed path analyzer is based on the block definition diagram that is further transformed to a XML Metadata Interchange (XMI) file to enable quick and easy hazard path analysis through a java-based application called XMISearch. Fig. 6 illustrates the XMI transformation of power source and fan elements in the EPS block definition diagram. In the first step, the java-based hazard path analyzer searches for hazardous components, in this case the power source with the hazard type of over current. This thread maybe propagated in all direction through conducting wires. In the second step, the process searches for potentially vulnerable components that are susceptible to the identified hazard in the previous step. The susceptibility of component is recognized by comparing the type of vulnerability of the component with the type of identified hazard. For the EPS system under consideration, the simple depth-first search [21] , [22] is applied. However more sophisticated search algorithms such as monte-carlo tree search [23] , [24] is necessary for a complex system since for these systems the vulnerability of a component to multiple hazards causes the search space to be large.
As illustrated in Fig. 5 , there are three hazard paths to be examined by the hazard path analyzer: from the power source to the AC resistor, fan, and DC resistor. In order to analyze the path from power source to the AC resistor, the path analyzer inspects the current sensor (IT240), relay (EY244), inverter (INV2), current sensor (IT267), relay (E272), and all the connections between the identified components for matching hazard transmitter types. This allows the algorithm to determine whether the hazard traverses from the source to the potentially vulnerable components. For the EPS system under consideration all the connections and components are carrier of over current spikes. Therefore, the examined path is recognized as hazardous. Fig. 7 illustrates the input and output of the proposed hazard path analyzer. Note that the outcome of the model-based hazard analysis for the EPS system allows the designers to modify the requirement specification document by including additional constrains that prevent the detected hazard from propagating from the power source to the vulnerable components.
Hazard Analysis Results in Design Mitigation
A possible resolution to the hazard identified in the previous section is the introduction of a new requirement that entails the battery relay to be controlled by a crew station using a battery switch. Any circuitry that is connected to the battery while battery is in off-mode, to be connected directly to the battery through suitable fuses or circuit breakers. The SysML requirement diagram is modified based on the newly added design constraint and is depicted in Fig. 8 .
Figure 8. SysML Requirement Diagram of reconfigured EPS System
As demonstrated in Fig. 9 the circuit breakers are added to the design at various points in the power distribution network to prevent over currents from causing unintended damage to the system components.The circuit breakers can be commanded externally to be closed or open. In order to verify and validate the safety aspects of the new architecture, the proposed model-based framework is reapplied to the new EPS design. The outcome of the hazard analysis similarly identified one sources of hazard, the power source, and three vulnerable components, the AC/DC resistors and Fan, which resulted in three hazard paths to be probed by the proposed path analyzer. The proposed path analyzer identified that the circuit breaker introduced to these paths are capable of eliminating the over current spikes and, therefore, removing this hazard. Figure 9 . Model of the electrical power system redesigned architecture
DESIGN SPACE EXPLORATION
The second application of the proposed model-based hazard methodology is to prevent unsafe design architectures to be selected from the space of feasible conceptual designs. A design space exploration process helps designers explore the vast space of potential design architects that meet configurational requirements for the system in a systematic fashion. With recent progress in engineering design research, graph grammar has emerged as promising technique to provide structured approach to the creation of complex engineering systems [25] , [26] .
In the case of EPS systems, this generative technique takes user specified EPS loads as input and satisfies system-level configuration requirements to generate feasible EPS candidate architectures. For instance, if there were configurational requirements to provide reliable power to certain electrical loads, this approach generates many feasible designs with alternative configurations for power generation (redundant and dissimilar sources), distribution e.g., redundant buse, and switching. The generative graph grammar gives an EPS architect the ability to systematically explore a large number of alternative EPS architectures that meet a given set of design constraints and objectives. From this pool of alternative architectures, it is the responsibility of the designer to verify the risk-free design of EPS. In order to make the safety analysis more effective, the proposed model-based hazard methodology is used. For instance, Figure 10 provides three different alternative architectures that are generated by the graph grammar technique. Figure 10 . three different alternative architectures that are generated by the graph grammar technique.
With the use of the proposed model-based hazard methodology the safety verification of different design alternative is performed. For example, the design alternative in Figure 10 .B is recognized as an unsafe design, because the two source of power are too close together and may cause a short circuit. A short circuit of the conductors may also generate excess heat which can cause damage to electrical devices.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Conventional safety-analysis approaches are not adequate enough to predict and prevent types of system accidents, where the cause of accident is not the result of an individual element failure or human error. The key to a safe and reliable design of complex systems is to ensure that not only the individual components and technologies but also their integrations are reliable and effective, resulting in safe and reliable systems. In our approach, to ensure safety and reliability, hazards and vulnerabilities information of components and subsystems are incorporated into the design process of the system as early as possible. At the early stages of design, where firm decisions about the use of specific components and connections have not been made yet, system designers can apply the proposed hazard detection methodology to avoid erroneous designs. The proposed methodology transforms requirement and hazard information and enables the investigation of system interactions and identification of hazard scenarios. In future work, more complex systems or sub-systems with combinations of hazards and vulnerabilities associated with each component can be evaluated. 
